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WHY WE ARE OUTRAGED: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF INTERNET GAMBLING
Frank Vandall*
While domestic casinos and lotteries take in about $84.7 billion
a year; internet gambling is worth about $12 billion. By comparison,
movies bring in about $23.24 billion a year.' Fifty-two percent of the
population gambles.2 Although all but two states (Utah and Hawaii)
permit gambling of some sort, none license internet gambling. 3 It is
therefore illegal in all 50 states. Estimates suggest that only 1% of the
population engages in internet gambling.4
Melissa Shettini Kearney argues that internet gambling is in-
expensive as compared to casinos.' What she means by this is that
you do not have to fly or drive to a casino.6 Further, the gambler does
not have to stay overnight, and thus pay for lodging. Internet gam-
bling is also private, meaning it can be done in the gamblers' home or
at the office.
Standing casinos in Nevada and other locales, give back to the
community in the form of wages and expenditures for services such as
airfare, gas, rooms and food. They also employ hundreds of thousands
of persons and pay taxes, which also stimulates the local economy.7 By
contrast, internet gambling sites keep it all. Indeed, they pay little for
a license and hire few employees.'
The core problem with regulating internet gambling is that the
large number of sites are located in foreign countries such as England,
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. B.A. 1964, Washington and
Jefferson College; J.D. 1967 Vanderbilt University School of Law; L.L.M. 1968,
S.J.D. 1979, University of Wisconsin Law School.
1 Ryan S. Landes, Layovers and Cargo Ships: The Prohibition of Internet Gam-
bling and a Proposed System of Regulation, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 913, 917 (2007).
2 Id. at 916-17; see id. at 926.
3 Melissa Shettini Kearney, The Economic Winners and Losers of Legalized Gam-
bling, 58 NAT'L TAx J. 4 (2005); id at 282 (stating that "[1legalized gambling
reached a record high of $78.6 billion in 2003").
4 Id. at 298.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 See Kearney, supra note 3, at 285; see also Landes, supra note 1, at 917, 920.
8 Landes, supra note 1, at 917 ("Casinos employed 354,921 people in 2005, paying
them a total of $12.6 billion in wages.").
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Costa Rica, and Gibraltar.9 The United States has no jurisdiction over
them and, at present, they are largely free to do as they wish.' Hav-
ing no jurisdiction over internet sites means that the United States
can do little to regulate them. Although the 2006 Act allows for prose-
cution of site operators, this is largely meaningless because they can-
not be arrested or prosecuted in their home countries."
The main thrust of the Safe Port Act of 2006 (2006 Act) is to
cut off the flow of funds from financial institutions to sites and to per-
mit prosecution of the internet gambling executives. 1 2 Ryan Landes
argues that numerous detours have been constructed around the U.S.
credit card companies so that imaginative U.S. residents are still able
to gamble on the internet. 3 Thus, in spite of the 2006 Act, internet
gambling continues.' 4
Why are we outraged? The United States is outraged because
no taxes are paid on the $6 billion that is shipped abroad.'" The mis-
ery and expenses, however, that follow internet gambling are distrib-
uted among the various states.'
6
The social cost of internet gambling is widespread: divorce, loss
of homes (that were put up as collateral), bankruptcies, gambling by
children, and suicides.'7 Melissa Shettini Kearney largely agrees.'
8
John Kindt looks further and argues that internet gambling will even-
tually disrupt foreign financial institutions and will likely cause
destabilization of developing countries. 19
9 Kearney, supra note 3, at 297 (numbering 1,800 foreign internet gambling sites);
John W. Kindt & Stephen W. Joy, Internet Gambling and the Destabilization of
National and International Economies, 80 DENY. U. L. REV. 111, 113 (2002) (point-
ing to twenty-five foreign sites); Landes, supra note 1, at 930.
10 Kindt, supra note 9, at 111.
11 See id. at 113 (stating that internet gambling is legal in the numerous sites
where they are licensed).
12 Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforce-
ment Act of 2006 Analyzed, 11 UNLV GAMING RESEARCH AND REVIEW J. 2, 3,
(2007), available at http://www.gamblingandthelaw.com/columns/2006_act.htm.
13 Landes, supra note 1, at 934.
14 Id. at 935-36.
15 Id. at 943; Kindt supra note 9, at 126, 129, 130.
16 Landes, supra note 1, at 927.
17 Landes, supra note 1, at n. 49; see Frank Vandall, Winning at Craps: Are Casi-
nos Vulnerable to State Suits for Social Costs? A Further Analysis of Causation,
Assumption of Risk and Sovereign Immunity, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=448920 (stating that the social cost to the state is very similar to the costs in-
curred because of casinos).
18 Kearney, supra note 3, at 14.
19 Kindt, supra note 9, at 116.
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Addictive personalities are drawn to internet gambling per-
haps more than standard casinos.2" These addicts are likely to lose big
and this will lead to bankruptcy and divorce in some cases.2 1 We are
further outraged that the costs of internet gambling are imposed on
the gamblers' home state with no contribution from the internet for-
eign site.2 2
The literature also decries the loss of control. 23 Careful read-
ing suggests, however, that the essential problem is that six billion
dollars leaves the United States and none returns in the form of
taxes.2 4 My thesis is that if internet gambling could be somehow taxed,
a portion of the money could be spread among the states to help defray
the costs of the social services expended on gamblers and their fami-
lies. The operative mechanism is that internet gambling executives,
such as site owners and operators, like to visit the United States.2 5
This has not been previously explored as a lever to obtain taxes.
Several internet gambling industry executives have been ar-
rested and prosecuted when they entered the United States.2 6 This
proves several things: first, the internet gambling executives like to
visit the United States, second, they are tracked by the U.S. govern-
ment, and third, it is thought desirable to arrest and prosecute them.
Several solutions to the lack of jurisdiction over internet gam-
bling sites have been proposed. First, the 2006 Act forbids internet
sites from receiving money from U.S. financial institutions and forbids
U.S. financial institutions from sending payments to foreign sites.
Second, Ryan Landes proposes a voluntary regulation of foreign sites,
who agree to reduce underage gambling and fraud, as well as pay
taxes. 28 Landes argues that these are the key problems with internet
gambling. 29 His proposal reads like a wish list for existing "bricks and
mortar" casinos as it would permit them to own internet gambling
sites. 30 My proposal is related, but different.
20 See id. at 114-15; Landes, supra note 1, at 919.
21 See Kindt, supra note 9, at 116, 121.
22 See Landes, supra note 1, at 927; see also Kindt, supra note 9, at 113, 153.
23 Kindt, supra note 9, at 127 (stating that the "main policy concern is that we lose
control"); see also Landes, supra note 1, at 926.
24 Kindt, supra note 9, at 126, 129; Landes, supra note 1, at 943.
25 See Landes, supra note 1, at 914, 935.
26 Id. at 914.
27 See Rose, supra note 12; Landes, supra note 1, at 932-36.
28 See Landes, supra note 1, at 937-43.
29 Id.
30 Landes, supra note 1, at 938 ("American casinos, currently out of the market
entirely, would gladly choose certification and regulation over outright exclusion
from the market.").
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I argue that, if the foreign site agrees to pay taxes and will
work to reduce underage gambling and fraud, we will allow their "des-
ignated employees" to visit the United States.3 1 Pointedly, I do not
open the door to American casinos to operate internet gambling sites,
nor propose a new agency. In the final analysis, the costs of gambling
may exceed its benefits.3 2
The fear of underage gambling seems to be essentially con-
cerned with gambling by college students (under twenty-one) or chil-
dren who steal their parents' credit cards. However, are these an
overreaction to a limited problem? College students make a large
number of mistakes and gambling on the internet seems like another
one. College has always carried a risk of suicide, to be sure. The fraud
mentioned in the literature appears to be that the internet site may
begin with high payouts and then shift to lower payouts and finally,
not payout at all.3 3 All of this is without notice to the gambler.3 4
There are at least two replies, first, the "market works" regardless of
less than perfect knowledge, and if rates worsen or if sites refuse to
pay, gamblers will move to another, more favorable site. Second, per-
haps fraud is part of the thrill: "new site, high payout rates, I bet."
Economically speaking, I would think that internet gamblers would
discount for fraud and chancy payouts. It seems to be similar to buy-
ing a used car which carries a large number of risks. If a site cheats, it
will lose business.
There are two major proposals for change. First, Landes ar-
gues for a new agency that will bring all internet gambling under one
roof. Reading between the lines, Landes seems to be arguing for a
mega-solution that will encourage internet gambling to grow by al-
lowing the huge, lucrative state casinos into the internet game:
At the core of the system is the Internet Gambling Regu-
lation Commission (IGRC), which would be created to
certify gambling websites that meet certain qualifica-
tions. Among these would be an effective method for ex-
cluding underage users, full disclosure of website and
financial operations (to protect against any kind of
fraud), the payment of a licensing fee or tax, and the re-
fusal to transact with financial service providers that
also transact with noncertified casinos. Operation of a
gambling website in the United States without IGRC
certification would be illegal as would fund transfers to
31 At present, once they enter the United States, they are subject to prosecution
and arrest. See Landes, supra note 1, at 914, 935.
32 Kearney, supra note 3, at 299.
33 See Kindt, supra note 9, at 114, 134; Landes, supra note 1, at 925.
34 See Landes, supra note 1, at 925.
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any such site. Since offshore casinos and financial insti-
tutions are not subject to American laws, the only way to
control them is to have them voluntarily abide by the
regulations. I will describe how each component of the
regulatory system would work and why users, foreign on-
line casinos, and foreign financial institutions would vol-
untarily opt into the scheme.
There are a number of ways for the IGRC to generate
revenue. It could charge an issuance fee for certification,
an annual license fee, a tax on revenues, or any combina-
tion thereof. Domestic casinos would surely give up a
portion of their potential profits for the chance to enter
the online market. Faced with new competition and the
prospect of an expanded user base, foreign casinos would
likely follow suit. Even a very modest tax rate would
likely be more than enough to fund the IGRC's entire op-
eration. Additional funds could go to educational pro-
grams, problem gambling treatment, cooperative foreign
governments, and the several states.3 5
The second solution is the Safe Port Act of 2006. It has had
some success, but has been extensively critiqued by others. 6
The clear benefits of my proposal are that it is voluntary, cheap
to administer and will open a dialogue with the foreign internet opera-
tors. My proposal expressly excludes the licensing of internet gam-
bling sites in the various states. Licensing would remain a power left
to the states, in coordination with the federal governments. This issue
will be addressed in a later article. It also holds the promise of a few
billion dollars in taxes. It could begin tomorrow with a simple an-
nouncement from the U.S. Attorney General.
A substantial benefit from my modest proposal is it may save
the government huge amounts in damages. The United States is being
sued by Antigua in the World Trade Organization for restraint of
trade.3 7 The core of Antigua's complaint is that because of our restric-
35 Id. at 937, 942.
36 Id. at 934; Rose, supra note 12.
37 Antigua, along with Barbuda and Costa Rica, sued in the World Trade Organi-
zation for damages that flowed from the U.S decision in May, 2007 to ban online
gambling in the United States. These three countries won before an arbitration
panel, Antigua is now seeking $2 billion in damages. Daniel Pruzin, Antigua,
Costa Rica Request Arbitration on Compensation in U.S. Gambling Dispute, 25
BNA INT'L TRADE REPORTER No. 5 (2008). "Antigua [claimed] the dozens of online
casinos based there are important to the islands' economy as its second-largest
employer." James Kanter & Gary Rivlin, Ruling Lets Antigua Be Pirate To Punish
U.S. in Trade Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2007, at C3, available at 2007 WLNR
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tive laws in regard to online gambling, Antigua's sites are losing
money.
The good news is that the United States may be able to argue
my tax program as a partial defense. With my program in place, the
United States will be able to claim that as long as online gambling
sites in Antigua pay taxes, C.E.O's from Antigua will not be prose-
cuted. Thus my suggestion could result in the avoidance of as much as
two billion dollars in damage awards by the World Trade
Organization.
My solution is cheap in that it only requires the name of the
site, the name of its chief officers and the amount of taxes paid in pro-
portion to the revenue from U.S. gamblers. A part time college student
working in the Attorney General's office could keep the tally. After she
receives a letter from the foreign site containing relevant information,
such as a list of "designated executives," the number of U.S. players for
the tax year, profits from the U.S. players and a certified check for the
appropriate taxes, she would then send a note to the A.G. informing
him of the internet "designated executives" who are now entitled to
"visit" the United States.38
A final benefit is that my proposal will offer competition for
standard casinos in Nevada, on the reservations and elsewhere. Com-
petition, as always, should help the market to work and prices to fall.
2526871. I thank Andrew Woods, Harvard Business School, for suggesting this
argument.
38 Specific details of my "proposal" will be the subject of a second paper. Com-
ments and suggestions are appreciated.
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